E 713 
.R2 
Copy 1 



LIBKHKY Uh CUNUKtbi> 



» M R , 

013 717 909 R 



Hollinger Corp. 
pH8.5 



Author 




Title 



Class 



Book 



>Kg. 



Imprint 



uy-<anit-t *«»© 



NOTES ON 



THE FOREIGN POLICY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 



SUGGESTED BY 
THE WAR WITH SPAIN 



BY 

CARMAN F. EANDOLPH 

AUTHOR OF "the LAW OF EMINKNT DOMAIN" 




NEW YORK 
THE DE VINNE PRESS 

1898 



GIFT 

MRSb WOOD ROW WlLSOJi 

NOV. 25, 1939 






NOTES ON THE 
FOREIGX POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



Before the declaration of war against Spain closed debate in 
this country as to the existence of a just cause it was asserted 
that International Law did not admit a right of intervention, 
under the circumstances, and it will be conceded that there is 
no rule of law to which an intervener may in any case appeal in 
justification. Nor is such a rule desirable, for the temptation to 
profit by the domestic troubles of a neighbor should not be en- 
couraged by adopting a rule so likely to be abused. But while 
the law of nations consecrates the normal right of each State to 
independence with all that independence implies, it is conceiv- 
able that a State may so misconduct its internal affairs as to pro- 
voke an intolerable situation, and lay itself open to intervention. 

Upon consideration it may be said that intervention is not 
unrighteous merely because it lacks formal recognition. Nor 
would it be righteous because of such recognition. The propri- 
ety of the act is to be determined in each case by the facts. 
If, then, a State shall intervene in the internal affairs of another, 
it does not necessarily commit a wrong, but, because indepen- 
dence is the essence of nationality, it is heavily burdened with the 
proof that it vindicates a right. 

European interventions would be without present interest were 
it not that because they have been undertaken usually by several 
Powers, and sometimes on account of a violation of guarantees, it 
has been suggested that a joint intervention possesses an author- 
ity incommunicable to the action of a single Power, aud that 



intervention because of a broken pledge has a peculiar merit. 
There is no Concert of Powers in America — there would be none 
in Europe did a single Power occupy there the place held by the 
United States in this hemisphere. 

Nor has Spain contracted with the United States in respect of 
the governing of Cuba. If, then, joint action or a broken pledge 
is a condition precedent to a just intervention, the course of the 
United States is unjustifiable. It is not perceived, however, how 
the propriety of an intervention can be affirmed or denied accord- 
ing as it is undertaken by several Powers or by one, for the 
situation in the objective country is the crucial point. If that 
situation does not call for intervention, a combination of all civ- 
ilized States could not justify the act. If it does call for inter- 
vention, any State with power may respond. Equally ill con- 
ceived is the suggestion that intervention because of a violated 
guarantee is especially meritorious. The exaction of the guar- 
antee is itself an intervention, for when a State agrees with a 
foreign Power to pursue a prescribed course in respect of its own 
subjects or its internal affairs, it qualifies its independence and 
must anticipate coercion if it breaks the agreement. 



Obviously the critical question in respect of intervention is 
whether the conditions in the objective country invite it. 

Civil disorder may rouse in a neighbor country so reason- 
able a fear for its own peace and safety that it may well inter- 
vene in self-defense. The United States do not plead this justi- 
fication for their intervention in Cuba. 

The material interests of a people may be damaged by dis- 
order in another country ; but intervention is not justifiable on 
this score alone. The United States maintained this position 
during the Civil "War, and it was respected by European Powers, 
some of whom, and especially Great Britain, suffered severely 
by the blockade of Southern ports. Our government alleges 
very properly the ruin of our Cuban trade, and the destruction 
of American property as reasons for our concern in the pacifi- 
cation of Cuba ; but these are not the actuating motives of in- 
tervention. 

Tlicre remains the broadest of all justifications — humanity. 
And upon this the American people rest their action, with a due 
apprehension, it is to be hoped, of the errors, the crimes even, 
into which a nation may be seduced by an exaggerated humani- 
tarianism. 



The United States have committed themselves by inaction to 
this limitation upon the impnlse to set a neighbor's house in 
order — that, as a rule, it is better for a free people to work out 
their own salvation, however painfully, than to be subjected to 
foreign rule. 

But a country hopelessly distracted because of a vicious po- 
litical system imposed from without may present a case for 
intervention. And this is the situation in Cuba. The attitude 
of Spain toward Cuba is unique in its contempt of the principles 
which are now presumed to govern a metropolitan State in deal- 
ing with colonists of her own race or planting. Yet colonists 
are but subjects after all, and shall not a State rule her subjects 
in her own way ? But Cuba is not ruled. Spain has failed, and 
it is her failure which invites the United States. Had Spain 
ruled Cuba we would have continued to respect her power, but 
we owe no duty in the premises to a government which does not 
govern. And if Spain reply that she could have subdued Cuba 
by the methods of Wej'ler, we retort that we do not recognize 
the right of a government to secure peace through depopulation. 



Apparently the situation in Cuba warrants intervention, but 
Spain presses two charges against us which must weaken our 
position if they are well founded. When a State has fomented 
or connived at the disorder which provokes its intervention, its 
action is scandalous, and Spain seeks to afl&x this stigma upon 
the United States. Now the very existence of our republic en- 
courages oppressed colonists to assert themselves, and we rejoice 
that our example has led colonies to independence and moved 
metropolitan States to reform colonial policies. Nor do we dis- 
avow a natural sympathy vrith the rebellion in Cuba. But our 
Government has duly exerted its powers to prevent illegal inter- 
course with the insurgents, and although Spain denies this, it 
cannot be doubted that had sympathy overcome our sense of 
obligation, Cuba would have been free years ago. 

The sense of obligation ruled our conduct until our Govern- 
ment decided that Spain was powerless to maintain her authority 
in Cuba by methods permissible to a civilized state. Here Spain 
takes issue with us. She charges that the decision was so unrea- 
sonable as to convict the United States of deliberately pervert- 
ing facts in order to excuse a settled determination to dispossess 
her. In this relation certain neutral Powers, indeed some of 
our own citizens, appear to be impressed by the assertion of the 



Spanish Government that it has made concession upon conces- 
sion, and that we have not allowed time for their effects to 
develop, but have pressed demands of increasing weight culmin- 
ating in the intolerable summons to evacuate Cuba forthwith. 
The Spanish Government has made concessions. It recalled 
General Weyler and revoked the order of reconcentration ; per- 
mitted the United States to succor reconcentrados and appro- 
priated money for the same purpose ; decreed a new regime of 
limited acceptance and uncertain authority and declared that 
Cuba was autonomous ; and in fine promised that Cuba should 
become another Canada. If palliatives, decrees, and prophecies, 
aU tendered under duress, had presaged the peace of Cuba, the 
United States would have been culpable in disregarding them, 
but in truth these must be viewed as devices to gain time, 
or at best as well meant but impotent efforts. 



II 



The success of intervention can be demonstrated only by the 
event, yet the United States have acted with assurance of power 
to terminate Spanish misrule in Cuba. In abating this nuisance 
they will have done all that is required by a strict construction 
of their responsibility, but because the condition of Cuba almost 
forbids the hope that order waits upon its evacuation by the 
Spanish forces, they have proclaimed an active interest in 
securing it. 

When Cuba shall be freed from Spanish rule, we may expect 
its people to mistrust the new Power which has driven out the 
old. This mistrust cannot be allayed by a joint resolution. 
Our conduct must convince the Cubans that we intend neither 
to annex nor despoil, but to aid in establishing an independent 
neighbor. 

The peace of Cuba wiU be our first concern, but we must not 
set up an unattainable standard of order for the Cubans, and 
then annex their island on the plea that they cannot govern it. 
Cuba may wait long for the order which we prescribe for our- 
selves, and indeed the peace of a Spanish-American state of the 
best type is not the peace of the United States. 



The early installation of a Cuban government is desirable not 
only for the sake of the Cubans but because pending this event 
the United States must undertake the provisional control of the 
island. The undertaking will be sufficiently vexatious, even as- 
suming, as I do, that it will be confided to trained soldiers and not 
to uniformed politicians. Yet it will be better to prolong our 
control than to recognize prematurely a Cuban government. 
When the authority of Spain shall disappear, the authority of 
the United States must replace it and prevail until a responsible 
local government shall be ready to assume control. The govern- 
ment of Cuba, which shall be definitely recognized by the United 
States, and may thereafter claim recognition from other nations, 
must be organized or ratified by the people of Cuba freely delib- 
erating and acting under the protection of our impartial author- 
ity. Although the United States will not assume to present 
Cuba with a plan of government, they should condition recog- 
nition upon the adoption of a plan which shall establish a new 
nation upon principles of justice. 

A further condition of recognition may be the ratification 
of a treaty containing such engagements and guarantees as may 
be necessary to secure the interests of the United States. 



Territorial aggrandizement is so often the real purpose of in- 
tervention that the United States are, not surprisingly, charged 
with intending to appropriate Cuba, notwithstanding their for- 
mal disclaimer. Nor has this disclaimer put away temptation. 
The European Powers would either approve the act or view it 
cynically as a result quite in harmony with their own theory of 
intervention, and even Spain might prefer to have Cuba ruled 
by the United States than by victorious rebels. Annexation 
has never lacked prophets and advocates, and opportunity will 
stimulate desire. An annexation party may appear in Cuba 
itself. More importantly the condition of Cuba may suggest 
that the humane impulse which prompted us to free the island 
should carry us on to secure its peace by governing it. Against 
the arguments for annexation must be opposed not merely the 
disclaimer contained in the joint resolution of Congress and re- 
peated in the ultimatum evaded by the Spanish Government, but 
the sohd reasons which prompted it. These reasons are that the 
interests of the United States will be better served by the inde- 
pendence of Cuba than by annexation; and that the Cubans 
ought not to pass from one master to another, however well dis- 



8 

posed the latter might be, but should have a fair opportunity to 
acquire the art of self-government, guided in their first steps bj-- 
the firm hand of the United States. If the oj^portunity shall not 
be embraced, the United States may be compelled eventually to 
modify their position. 



Ill 



The war with Spain has revived the scheme to annex Hawaii. 
It has been suggested that our forces should occupy the islands 
with the consent of their rulers upon the plea of military neces- 
sity, the intention being to force Congress to assume jurisdiction 
in due form over territory practically abandoned to the United 
States. The suggestion is intolerable. The seizure of Hawaii 
by a coup d'etat would be a shameful abuse of executive power. 
But, the question of method apart, the situation in respect 
of annexation is really unchanged by the state of war. For 
five years the ruling class in Hawaii have been trying to 
break into the Union with the aid of powerful friends on the 
inside, yet the most persistent efforts have failed to induce the 
majority of the American people to let down the bars, although 
a minority are honestly convinced that annexation is desirable. 
Twice has a treaty of annexation failed in the Senate and the 
expedient of a joint resolution promised the same result. The 
project is now resurrected as a " war measure." 

The exigencies of war do not demand the reversal of our atti- 
tude toward Hawaii. Even if Spain had a Pacific fleet. Congress 
should not be frightened into accepting the islands. But Spain 
has no sea power in the Pacific. Her fleet has been destroyed ; 
her chief port in the Philippines is dominated by the United 
States. Honolulu would be a convenient base of supplies dur- 
ing our control over Manila, but the perpetual obligation of an 
annexation is not to be assumed in consideration of a temporary 
convenience. 

If the United States shall commit the blunder of annexing 
the Philippines they must assume the burden of Hawaii. If, 
however, the Philippines are held out as a lure for Hawaii, the 
American people should clearly understand the true sequence of 
these projects and pay no attention to the gnat until they have 
swallowed the camel. 



IV 

Admiral Dewey's achievement at Manila may present the 
United States with the problem of dealing definitively with ter- 
ritorj' in the other hemisphere. A proper solution is not sug- 
gested by our experience, but it is well within our competency if 
we shall be inspired by true conceptions of duty and interest. 



Sharp practitioners assert that whatever moral obligation may 
restrain us from appropriating Cuba, we have a free hand in the 
Philippines because we have made no disclaimer in respect of 
them. This distinction is immoral. "We have made war upon 
Spain because of the intolerable condition of a neighboring 
colon}', and prefaced our action by a disclaimer of grasping mo- 
tives. The moral strength of this position will be impaired if we 
unnecessarily appropriate a remote possession of Spain, the con- 
dition of which was never the object of our concern, much less 
of remonstrance. Yet the United States may be compelled even- 
tually to treat the Philippines as divorced from Spain, without 
evading any self-imposed restraint. Spain's authority over the 
islands is vigorously disputed by rebels, and it is jeopardized by 
our legitimate operations at Manila. In view of these facts and 
the internal weakness of the metropolitan State, the close of the 
war may find the Philippines irretrievably lost to Spain. The 
active duty of the United States, in this event, cannot be fore- 
casted, for the disposition of this great domain will depend upon 
conditions not yet developed. Possibly the intense rivalry be- 
tween the European Powers may suggest a government for the 
islands modeled upon the lines of the Congo State ; or they might 
be transferred to the Dutch, who are independent, yet not aggres- 
sively strong, and have demonstrated their ability to administer 
the Philippines by their long and successful rule in Java. 

The passive duty of the United States is clearly foreshadowed. 
The Philippines ought not to be annexed, because the considera- 
tions which discourage the annexation of Cuba, Ijang at om* 
very door, are absolutely prohibitive in the case of territory six 
thousand miles over sea, and peopled by millions of barbarians. 

Our passive duty in respect of the Philippines and other terri- 
tory over sea is commended by our established policy — we neither 
covet possessions beyond America nor permit foreign nations 
to aggrandize their domains at the expense of American States. 

Now in the heat of battle we are urged to dismember our 



10 

policy and intrench ourselves abroad. The project should not be 
dismissed merely because of its novelty. When the American 
people balk at a momentous enterprise because it is novel, they 
will have lost their courage; when they rush into one for the sake 
of change they will have lost their balance. So this project must 
be considered with minds free from timidity, yet intent to 
determine its true bearings. 



Publicists who approve the departure from the old ways, but are 
not dazzled by the notion that the United States, after chastis- 
ing Spain, will at once be able to guard America with one hand 
and seize territory abroad at will with the other, are captivated 
by the suggestion of an alliance which would bring to our aid 
the mighty fleet of Great Britain, open coaling stations around 
the globe, and enable us to launch a colonial policy under the 
auspices of the great colonizing Power. This method of gaining 
an end goes far to discredit the end itself. Alliances, save in 
cases of emergency, are quite as repugnant to the interests of 
the United States now as they were when Washington condemned 
them, and the opportunity to seize land in Asia is not an emer- 
gency, but a situation created by our deliberate act. 

The alliance would not be without its price. What must we 
pay Great Britain? It would be a threat to other nations. 
Why should we menace States with whom we are at peace? 
The history of alliances is a record of forced companionship, of 
mutual distrust, of broken pledges. But it will be argued that 
an Anglo-American alliance would be ennobled and perpetuated 
by common ideals and interests. This argument is not without 
attraction ; but a review of Anglo-American relations does not 
inspire a belief in its soundness. The present situation fore- 
casts a better understanding between the United States and 
Great Britain than can be reached by entering into bonds. We 
have the open sympathy of Great Britain in our contest with 
Spain, and when I say that it were ill bestowed elsewhere, I pay 
the highest compliment to her sagacity and her sense of justice. 
We may believe that her friendliness is expressed by works as 
well as by words. Unquestionably Americans and Englishmen 
should hereafter prefer to dwell upon the common interests of 
English-speaking people rather than to accentuate their circum- 
stantial differences; and other Powers may be assured that 
should their combined forces unjustly attack either guardian of 
these interests, the other will come to the rescue. This emer- 



11 

gency has not arisen, and nothing is so likely to prevent it 
as the fear of a union between the English-speaking peoples. 
We should be satisfied for the present, I think, with the whole- 
some impression created by the talk of alliance. 



An economic argument for the expansion of the United States 
is fairly summed up in the following propositions: 1. Our 
ability to produce so greatly exceeds our capacity to consume 
that wider markets are necessary. 2. Other nations are over- 
running vast fields of present and prospective commercial value 
in order to monopolize their trade. 3. The United States must, 
therefore, seize compensating fields, or at least acquire such 
strongholds as will tend to check the advance of their rivals. 
The first proposition is incontestable. The second depicts the 
most striking movement of our time, but this movement does 
not in its present stage forbode disaster to America, and should 
not mislead the United States into reversing their policy in ac- 
cordance with the suggestion of the last proposition. 

The economic alignment has in view the question of the Far 
East, and especially the future of China. Now, it is possible 
that certain districts in China never opened to our trade will 
remain closed although they have passed into the control of 
European Powers, but, on the other hand, a large area has been 
thrown open through British influence. As matters stand we 
have the advantage of new fields without the loss of old ones, 
and Great Britaiu, though not always successful in checking the 
advance of her rivals, usually holds gained ground. Whether 
more extended fields in China shall be opened to us is another 
question, yet in this relation the action of Russia should be esti- 
mated at its probable value. The building of the Siberian rail- 
road is the most Anglo-Saxon work that Russia has ever done, 
and the acquisition of a terminal on the Pacific crowns the en- 
terprise. In mo\dng to an open sea on the line of least resis- 
tance, Russia has simply followed the route of a virile people, 
and the open sea means eventually commerce, and commerce 
means exchange. 

The protectionist dogma of the sufficiency of the home 
market is weakening before the palpable necessity for wider 
markets for our manufactures, and the outward impetus given 
by a foreign war ought to demolish it. Yet we can expand our 
commerce without abandoning our traditional and well founded 
policy. 



12 

The expedition to the Philippines itself opens a wider market 
in Asia, and at the close of hostilities we will be in a position to 
secure further advantages in that direction. But after all, is not 
our sudden appreciation of Asia exaggerated ? Valuable as is the 
trade of the Far East, great as are its possibilities, do we not 
magnify its relative importance through a mistaken view of the 
great struggle for China ? The commercial interests involved, 
however great in themselves, are incidental to the larger political 
question, the Balance of Power. Every advance made by Russia 
in China brings her nearer to India. The real " Question of the 
Far East " is not. Who shall sell the most goods to the Chinese, 
but, Shall Russia rule Asia ? 

"We need not seek commercial salvation by way of conquest in 
the Far East. We may gain our share of the world's trade without 
annexing an acre of land over sea. Our exports to South Amer- 
ica, Africa, and to Europe itself can be vastly increased by the 
enterprise of our merchants encouraged by a revision of tariff 
laws. 

The acquisition of territory in the Far East would involve the 
United States as surely and perhaps as deeply in European poli- 
tics as though they touched the fringe of Europe itself, for Asia, 
and Africa as well, are for the most part appanages of Europe. 
In full view of the consequences we are urged to intrench our- 
selves in Asia. We are told that our political isolation, however 
advantageous during the youth of the Republic, is now the sign 
of a selfish and timid provincialism. 

This is a perverse view of a really admirable position. "Iso- 
lation " does not suggest provincialism. It can hardly be said to 
express a policy. It simply depicts the situation of the United 
States — a country without powerful and intrusive neighbors, 
and wishing none. 

We shall depreciate the Monroe Doctrine if we assume a con- 
cern in the disposition of territory in the Old World which we 
deny to European States in the New. Indeed, it may be argued 
that as the doctrine expresses our repugnance to contact with 
these States, we suggest its obsolescence if we seek contact 
abroad. Why should we risk the prisiacy of a hemisphere 
for a part interest in the Far East? 

The abandonment of our normal attitude of impartial and 
temperate friendliness toward the States of Eui'ope would pro- 
voke discord at home. Millions of American citizens are of for- 
eign birth or parentage, and should the Republic become involved 
in the web of Euroj^ean intrigue and thus be led to favor or oppose 



13 

now this Power and now that one, the instinctive sympathy and 
prejudice of race would assert themselves. The bickerings of Old 
World factions would disturb our politics and accentuate racial 
differences which in the interest of American unity should dis- 
appear. 

Americans are not impelled to conquer by the need of mar- 
kets or of new lands for an overcrowded people, though these 
excuses are paraded ; nor will the hope of converting heathen to 
Christianity and republicanism allure them. The sole motive 
will be the imperial idea — the uugoverned impulse to conquer, 
and the imperial idea is repugnant to our political creed. 

The weapons of imperialism are force and intrigue, and these 
must be wielded by an executive authority more strongly cen- 
tralized and more powerful than the American people have 
deemed to be compatible with their interests. We need not 
apprehend anything like Russian autocracy or perhaps French 
military republicanism, but our Administration must be assured 
of support in any move that will advance the flag. This is sub- 
stantially the situation in Great Britain, where Her Majesty's 
Government hav^e carte blanche to enlarge the Empire by 
treaty and, substantially, by occupation, and Parliament is ex- 
pected to pass such measures as may be necessaiy to sustain 
their action. 



No advocate of the imperial policy has dared to guess at its 
cost ; but when we remind ourselves that about one half of the 
federal revenue is now expended on war account, including, of 
course, pensions, that new war bonds will increase the interest 
charge by millions, and that other millions must be added for 
new pensions and an inevitable increase in the military estab- 
lishment, we prefigure already a war budget vastly exceeding 
that of either Great Britain, Russia, Germany, or France — the 
great Military Powers. Add to this the expense of acquiring 
and maintaining possessions thousands of miles over sea, and of 
supporting the imperial estate, and the burden of taxation will 
be far weightier than our people ought to bear in time of peace. 

What strength shall be added to our institutions by acquiring 
territory in the distant land toward which our eyes are turned ? 
There is not a prospective State of the Union in Asia. Nor a 



14 

prospective Territory where the people may govern themselves 
under federal supervision until statehood shall be conferred. 
Nor even a prospective colony in the best sense of the term — a 
land peopled by emigrants from a mother country. There is 
nothing for the United States in Asia but perpetual provinces, 
and provincial government is nothing but the rule of force ap- 
plied to subject peoples. 

Whether or not the provincial relation is technically lawful 
under our Constitution, it is plainly opposed to the true spirit of 
an instrument designed to unite self-governing and indestructi- 
ble States. 



When a nation declares war, it should as a rule exert its 
powers with sole regard to the avowed purpose, and this self-re- 
straint is especially commended in a war undertaken in the 
interest of humanity. Yet war may create or disclose situa- 
tions justifying a successful aggressor in broadening its opera- 
tions, and in conducting peace negotiations with a view to 
heavier demands than the original purpose calls for. When 
the aggressor is so manifestly the superior combatant that its 
success is only a question of time, it may decide that resistance 
prolonged in desperation after national honor shall have been 
creditably defended is a distinct aggravation of the original griev- 
ance, to be accounted for in the final settlement. These consid- 
erations bear upon the policy of the United States in respect of 
Spanish territory and of indemnity. 

Spain's possessions in Asia are beyond the sphere of our legiti- 
mate interest, and the operations against them are justified only 
as they are calculated to bring her more speedily to terms in 
Cuba. If then the campaign against the Philippines shall be 
pressed to the extinction of Spanish sovereignty, the result will 
be due to the prolongation of hopeless resistance in Cuba. 
Porto Rico is in different case. This island lies within our 
sphere of interest, and considerations of justice, no less than 
policy, may warrant the United States in dealing with it as with 
Cuba. 

As to indemnity, not a life nor a dollar should be spent in 
placing a mortgage on Spanish territory. Indeed, if Spain shall 
sue for peace in due season let us pay our own bills and not 
grind a beaten people. 



15 

A victory over Spain will advance the position of the United 
States in America. A few years ago we called the attention of 
our most powerful neighbor to the Monroe Doctrine with satis- 
factory results, and soon we may rid ourselves of our most 
troublesome one. Thenceforth the United States will enjoy ac- 
knowledged supremacy in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean 
Sea. Outposts in the West Indies will be the visible signs of 
supremacy ; and it may appear that one or more of these may 
be located in Cuba itself, as well to the advantage of the Cubans 
as our own. 

Let us reject the idea of acquiring territory abroad and a seat 
in a Concert of Powers, and rely upon the strength of our inde- 
pendent position, the wisdom of oui* laws, and the courage and 
enterprise of our people to further our immediate interests in 
foreign lands — the protection of our citizens, and the expan- 
sion of our trade. 

Let us welcome the prestige which the war confers upon the 
Republic. The declaration of war in the interest of humanity, 
the expeditions to the Philippines, the ability to shoot straight 
from a rolling platform, mark the advent of a new force in the 
world. This force may be exerted if need be in any righteous 
cause, and if need shall arise the United States will see their 
duty more clearly and perform it the better for being unem- 
barrassed by possessions abroad or by complex relations with the 
States of the Old World. 

MoRRiSTOWN, New Jersey, June 10, 1898. 



LIBKHKY Uh CUNOKti>b 

llllll'l'^'ll'''lll'i'll'IIPW"ll"l'IIINI"ll' 



013 717 909 fi 



Hollinger Corp. 
pH8.5 



LibKHKY Ul- UUNUKti>b 

iiiiiiiHiii 



013 717 909 A 



Hollinger Corp. 
pH8.5 



